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While it is recognized that the family is primarily an institution for risk sharing, little is
known about the quantitative eﬀects of this informal source of insurance on savings and labor
supply. In this paper, we present a model where workers (females and males) are subject
to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete. A household is
formed by a female and a male, who make collective decisions on consumption, savings and
labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model, we ﬁnd that precautionary savings are
only 55% of those generated by a similar economy that lacks access to insurance from the
family. We also ﬁnd that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-
poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across
unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, in the
group of households with wealth less than two months worth of income, average hours worked
by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed
husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes up 9% of lost family income. We also ﬁnd
crowding out eﬀects of public unemployment insurance that are comparable to those estimated
from the data.
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11 Introduction
The lack of a formal, private insurance market against employment risk makes this type of risk
diﬀerent from most of others faced by individuals. Even though public, compulsory unemploy-
ment insurance schemes are present in many countries, they typically fall short of providing full
insurance and workers must rely on self-insurance and on informal insurance mechanisms in order
to smooth consumption across unemployment spells. Precautionary savings and labor supply are
the two instruments individuals can use as self-insurance against employment risk. The family, on
the other hand, is the main informal insurance mechanism available to individuals, with the stan-
dard argument being that information and payment enforceability are better within than between
households.1
In this paper, we present an incomplete markets economy with idiosyncratic employment risk and
assess quantitatively the role of the family as provider of insurance. Intra-household risk sharing,
more than any other informal insurance mechanism, has important behavioral implications that
aﬀect not only the demand of self insurance, but also how this is crowded out by public insur-
ance programs. Indeed, recent empirical evidence on patterns of insurance against employment
risk found in a large panel of U.S. households sheds light on these crowding out eﬀects. More
speciﬁcally, Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate the response in two
forms of insurance —accumulation of ﬁnancial assets and spousal labor supply— to changes in
the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts and ﬁnd signiﬁcant crowding out eﬀects on both. The
extent to which public insurance crowds out other forms of (private) insurance is of paramount
importance for public policy assessment [see, e.g., Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2002), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2010) for analyses on
the optimal level of social insurance when other forms of private insurance are also available.]
The model economy we present in this paper consists of a large number of two-person households,
each pooling risks and making collective decisions on individual consumptions, labor supplies and
joint savings in a risk-free asset, subject to a borrowing constraint. The two persons forming a
household, a female and a male, are assumed to have diﬀerent individual preferences for risk and
diﬀerent elasticities of labor supply. Individual weights in the household’s utility function are
determined, among other variables, by their relative earning ability. There is a ﬁrms sector pro-
ducing an homogeneous good with capital and labor services, and a government providing public
unemployment insurance. In order to assess the consequences of within-household risk sharing,
the equilibrium in this economy is then compared to that arising in an economy where individuals
lack access to insurance from the family and are left with self-insurance and public beneﬁts as their
1Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) estimate the degree of consumption insurance from U.S. data and ﬁnd
evidence that the family plays an important insurance role.
2only instruments to cope with employment risk. This latter framework corresponds to a standard
Aiyagari-Huggett economy augmented with a labor-leisure choice, which has been studied by, e.g.,
Flod´ en and Lind´ e (2001), Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006), among
others.
Since the equilibrium of our model economy contains a distribution of households over ﬁnancial as-
sets and spouses’ employment status, we can assess not only the average eﬀects of intra-household
risk sharing but also its eﬀects for diﬀerent groups of households. Thus, in a calibrated version
of our model we ﬁnd that precautionary savings are only 55% of those generated by a similar
economy that lacks access to insurance from the family. This is a large drop in precautionary
savings that should be taken into account when assessing the ability of general equilibrium models
with idiosyncratic income risk to generate large volumes of precautionary savings (see, e.g., D´ ıaz,
Pijoan-Mas and R´ ıos-Rull 2003 for a discussion on the extent of precautionary savings in these
models).
We also ﬁnd that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor house-
holds. While the wealth rich use savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells,
wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, in the group of households
with wealth less than two months worth of income, average hours worked by wives of unem-
ployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. Moreover, this
response in wives’ hours makes up 9% of lost family income.
The crowding out eﬀects of public unemployment insurance in our calibrated economy are com-
parable to those found in the data. On the contrary, the standard Aiyagari-Huggett model of self
insurance over-predicts the response in savings to changes in public insurance by a large margin.
For example, this model predicts an elasticity of asset holdings with respect to unemployment
beneﬁts that is almost four times the elasticity estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001). As should
be apparent, the Aiyagari-Huggett model cannot account either for the crowding out eﬀects of
unemployment beneﬁts on spousal labor supply. Hence, models that abstract from risk sharing
at the level of the household introduce an important bias both in the extent of the precaution-
ary motive in the face of unemployment risk and in the distortionary eﬀects of public insurance
programs on savings and labor supply.
There is a vast literature, both empirical and theoretical, assessing the eﬀects of idiosyncratic
income risk on consumption, labor supply and savings. With only few exceptions, this literature
adopts the bachelor household formulation in order to measure individual responses to income
shocks and the degree of endogenous self-insurance. A recent example of this type of exercise is
the paper by Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2008). These authors assume that individuals (they
focus only on males) are subject to a rich array of idiosyncratic shocks, including productivity and
3employment shocks. These shocks are assumed to diﬀer in their available insurance opportunities
(employment shocks are partially insured by the public unemployment insurance system while
productivity shocks are not). The authors then use a bachelor household model to measure the
eﬀects of these shocks and the individual willingness to pay to avoid them. Since they consider
endogenous mobility choices, their paper extends previous results in the literature by adding a
new channel from shocks to individual responses to shocks.
Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) is one of the ﬁrst papers in economics to study the family as a provider
of insurance to its members. In particular, they present a model where the only risk is that of
unexpected longevity. Their model abstracts from labor earnings and assumes that an initial
level of wealth is the only source of resources available to consumers. They show that eﬃcient
risk-sharing within the family closes much of the utility gap between no annuities and complete
annuities. For example, the utility gain of marriage at age 30 is about 50% of the utility gain of an
annuities market. In a model with these ingredients, Kotlikoﬀ, Shoven and Spivak (1986) study
precautionary savings arising from longevity risk. They compare savings under perfect insurance
markets with savings under intra-household risk sharing. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
savings.
A more recent exception to the use of the bachelor household formulation is the work of Attanasio,
Low and S´ anchez-Marcos (2005), who present a partial equilibrium model with a two-person
unitary household to assess the response of female labor market participation (extensive margin)
to idiosyncratic earnings risk within the family. In their model, male participation is exogenous.
An important feature of this model is the process of female human capital formation, which is
assumed to depend on labor market participation. The authors ﬁnd that the higher the uncertainty
the higher female participation. They also ﬁnd that the welfare cost of uncertainty is lower when
households can adjust female labor market participation.
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010) also use a two-person, unitary household model to
study the welfare implications of the observed changes in the U.S. wage structure. In particular,
they present an incomplete-markets, life-cycle model to quantify the eﬀects of the rising college
premium, the narrowing wage gender gap and the increasing wage volatility. Their model allows
for an endogenous education choice and for a process matching females and males into house-
holds. Even though the welfare consequences of the above-mentioned changes in wages are highly
heterogenous across diﬀerent types of households, they ﬁnd that, on average, recent cohorts of
households enjoy welfare gains, as the new structure of wages translates into higher educational
attainment.
Unitary models of the household, however, assume a utility function for the household and are
thus silent about the decision process between its members. The collective model (see Browning,
4Chiappori and Lechene 2006 for a formal deﬁnition of this model) establishes instead that this
decision process leads to within-household Pareto optimality and that Pareto weights on individ-
uals’ private utility functions depend on prices, policy variables and distribution factors. Thus,
in this latter model, changes in the wage gender gap, in public unemployment beneﬁts and/or in
tax rates imply within-household distributional eﬀects that unitary models fail to capture. More-
over, in economies with idiosyncratic risks and incomplete asset markets, these eﬀects, along with
heterogeneity in individuals’ risk preferences, have sizable implications for precautionary savings
and labor supplies. Consequently, the two models of the household predict diﬀerent crowding out
eﬀects of public unemployment insurance. Tests of these two competing models of the household
have been carried out by, e.g., Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998), who
ﬁnd evidence against the unitary model. In particular, they reject the income pooling restrictions
and the symmetry of cross-wage eﬀects which are embodied in this model.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment
and presents the problems solved by the bachelor and the collective household. Section 3 deﬁnes
a stationary equilibrium with incomplete markets in the collective household economy. It also
presents the parameterization and calibration of this economy; it shows the steady-state equilib-
rium and discusses some features of the policy functions. Section 4 presents the main results on
the aggregate and individual consequences of intra-household risk sharing. Section 5 concludes.
The paper contains four appendices.
2 The Economic Environment
Consumers The economy is populated by a continuum of measure two of inﬁnitely-lived work-
ers/consumers. Half of this population of workers/consumers will be referred to as females, and
the other half as males. All enjoy the consumption of an aggregate good and of leisure time (with
possibly diﬀerent utility functions). Agents supply time to work in the production sector and face
idiosyncratic labor market risk in the form of employment shocks.
Employment shocks, s, take on values in S ≡{ 0,1} and follow a Markov chain with transition
matrix Πi, where superscript i denotes the gender: females (f) and males (m). Thus, πi
s |s is
the probability for an agent of gender i to receive employment shock s  tomorrow conditional on
employment shock s today, for i = f,m. These probabilities satisfy

s  πi
s |s =1 ,πi
s |s > 0, and
πi
1|1 ≥ πi
1|0 for i = f,m. The long-run probabilities of the two employment shocks in S are denoted
by qi
0 and qi
1. There are no others shocks in the economy.
Markets are incomplete. The only asset in the economy is a non-state contingent asset that pays
the risk-free interest rate r. Moreover, there is a minimum level of asset holdings, a, which is a
5borrowing or liquidity constraint.





βtUi(ct,l t), for i = f,m, (2.1)
where ct denotes consumption and lt is leisure. We make the following assumptions on Ui:
A1. Utility Ui(c,l):R+ × [0,1] → R is bounded, continuous and twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable in the interior of its domain.
A2. Utility is separable in consumption and leisure.
A3. Utility Ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each of its arguments. Moreover,
limc→0 Ui
c(c,l)=+ ∞, and liml→0 Ui
l(c,l)=+ ∞.
Firms Production of the aggregate good is conducted by competitive ﬁrms. Production tech-
nology is represented by the neoclassical production function F(K,L), where K is the aggre-
gate stock of capital and L is aggregate labor. The depreciation rate of capital is denoted by
δ>0. Throughout the paper, we will assume the standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
F(K,L)=KαL1−α, where 0 <α<1 is the capital’s share of income and L ≡ λLm +( 1− λ)Lf.
That is, female and male labor are perfect substitutes and parameter 0 <λ<1 pins down relative,
gross-of-taxes wages. The ﬁrm’s maximization problem is static: given a rental price of capital r
and gross wages for females and males ¯ wf and ¯ wm, respectively, ﬁrst-order conditions are:
FK(K,L)=r + δ (2.2)
λFL(K,L)= ¯ wm (2.3)
(1 − λ)FL(K,L)= ¯ wf. (2.4)
Government There is a government that provides public insurance against unemployment shocks.
The government pays out beneﬁts bi to unemployed workers of gender i = f,m. Only workers
who receive an unemployment shock are entitled to beneﬁt payments. The government ﬁnances
its expenditures by levying linear taxes on labor income: given tax rates τi, we will denote after-
tax wage rates by wi =( 1− τi)¯ wi. The government is required to balance its budget on a
period-by-period basis.
2.1 The Bachelor versus the Collective Household Model
We now consider two diﬀerent risk-sharing arrangements and study their implications for labor
supply (of both females and males) and for precautionary savings. Each arrangement deﬁnes
6in turn a diﬀerent type of household. We start out by presenting the problem of the bachelor
household. This is the deﬁnition of household that has dominated not only the literature on
precautionary savings, but also most of the macroeconomic literature. The deﬁning feature of
this type of household is that a single breadwinner chooses sequences of consumption, leisure and
asset holdings in order to maximize his/her own lifetime utility. In most studies adopting this
framework, the income process is estimated using data on males. The second type of household we
study is a dynamic version of the collective household model pioneered by Chiappori (1988). In
this latter case, we assume that two adult individuals, with possibly diﬀerent preferences, wages
and unemployment risk, form a household and then make collective decisions on consumptions,
labor supplies and savings. In order to understand the consequences of intra-household risk sharing
we compare allocations generated by this latter model with those emerging under the bachelor
formulation.
2.1.1 Bachelor Households








s |svi(s ,a  ;wi,r)

(2.5)
c + a  = wi(1 − l)s +( 1− s)bi +( 1+r)a (2.6)
c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, and a  ∈ [ai,¯ a], (2.7)
where πi
s |s are the elements of Πi. The minimum level of assets this agent can hold is denoted
by ai. A version of this model where there is a measure one of same-gender workers is the
workhorse model in the literature of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, precautionary savings and
labor supply (see, e.g., Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil 2007). Flod´ en and Lind´ e (2001) and
Pijon-Mas (2006) also study a model with a measure one of same-gender, bachelor households
where workers receive idiosyncratic shocks to the eﬃciency units of labor supply, instead of an
employment/unemployment shock.
By construction, the bachelor household does not engage in informal insurance arrangements with
other workers. The only sources of insurance available to this type of household are the public
unemployment insurance system, own savings and own labor supply.
2.1.2 Collective Households
We now consider two-person, collective households formed by an egotistical female and an ego-
tistical male. We assume that the two members of the household share labor market risk in
7such a way that intra-household allocations are eﬃcient.2 Following the literature of collective
households (see Chiappori and Donni 2010 for a recent survery), the utility of each individual in
the household carries a weight, reﬂecting the relative power of that individual in the household.
Individual weights are assumed to depend on variables such as premarital wealth, the population
sex ratio, relative earnings and government policy. Under full commitment, that is, when house-
hold members can commit to future intra-household allocations, individual weights are set when
the household is formed and remain unchanged thereafter. Thus, transitory shocks, which are
small relative to lifetime income, have no eﬀect on individual weights. Only variables known or
predicted at the time of household formation can aﬀect those weights.3 In our model there are
four sources of earning diﬀerences between females and males that aﬀect relative Pareto weights:
1) They have diﬀerent gross wages; 2) They may pay diﬀerent tax rates; 3) They may receive
diﬀerent levels of unemployment beneﬁts; and, 4) Finally, females and males may be subject to
diﬀerent employment and unemployment spells. We write the Pareto weight on female’s utility as
μ(x,z) ∈ (0,1), where function μ is assumed to be diﬀerentiable with respect to its ﬁrst argument.












i for j = f,m and i =0 ,1 is, as written above, the long-run probability of employment
state i for an agent of gender j. Vector z includes variables such as the population sex ratio, the
initial contribution to household wealth, etc., which we do not model explicitly in this paper. It
must be noted that in our model the Pareto weight function, μ(x,z), is not obtained as the outcome
of an explicit bargaining process between females and males. Instead, we will use estimates of the
sharing rule provided by Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) to parameterize
and solve our model.4
Household-level state variables for the two-person, collective household are the vector of employ-
ment shocks s =( sf,s m), which we assume to be uncorrelated within the household,5 and the
level of asset holdings, a. The state space of a household is X = S × S × [a,¯ a]. We denote by B
the Borel sigma algebra of X. The transition matrix for s is denoted by Π and obtained from the
2It should be noted, however, that in two-person households the number of family members involved in risk
pooling is too small to achieve full insurance against labor market risk.
3For a test of intra-household commitment to future allocations, see Mazzocco (2007). Using data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, this author rejects the hypothesis of commitment. Since our model abstracts from
permanent shocks and assumes only transitory shocks to labor income, we will retain, for the sake of analytical
tractability, the assumption of commitment.
4In a recent paper Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009) endogenize the Pareto weight as the solution to
a symmetric Nash bargaining problem within the household.
5We will discuss further this independence assumption below.
8individual transition matrices as Π = Πm ⊗ Πf. The vector of after-tax wages for the household,
(wf,wm), is denoted by w.
The maximization problem of a collective household with Pareto weight μ(x,z) on female’s utility
is
V (s,a;x,z,r)= m a x
cf,cm,lf,lm,a 









cf + cm + a  =

i=f,m
wi(1 − li)si +

i=f,m
(1 − si)bi +( 1+r)a (2.10)
cf,c m ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lf,l m ≤ 1, and a  ∈ [a,¯ a], (2.11)
where πs|s are the elements of Π. Note that while we allow for diﬀerent preferences over con-
sumption and leisure for females and males, we assume that both spouses share a common discount
factor β. In our model, z is the only source of variation in Pareto weights across households. We
represent the distribution of these weights in the population of households by G(μ). The support
of this distribution is denoted by M ≡ (0,1).
Contrary to unitary models of the household, the utility function of the collective household
depends, via the Pareto weight, on wages and policy variables, which leads to household demands
that fail to meet the Slutsky conditions. This failure is the deﬁning feature of the collective
model. Also, while in unitary models household decisions do not depend on who receives the
income within the household, in our collective model decisions depend on total income as well as
on who receives the income (whether it is the female or the male).
The dependency of the household’s utility function on prices and policy must also be acknowl-
edged when setting the Frisch elasticities of labor supply for females and males. In particular,
these elasticities are functions of the derivative of the Pareto weight with respect to wages. Our
assumption that both labor supplies can vary continuously in response to wages and non-labor
income is common in the literature of collective labor supply [see, e.g., Chiappori (1988) and
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002)].6 Likewise, the household’s attitude towards risk in the
collective model depends both on individual preferences and on the relative Pareto weight. Since
we will assume individual preferences which are not of the ISHARA type (i.e., household members
do not share a common coeﬃcient of harmonic risk-aversion), the household does not behave as a
6For a recent study of collective labor supply allowing for non continuity see Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and
Meghir (2007). These authors present a collective model of the household where the female makes a continuous
labor supply choice but the male decides simply whether or not to participate.
9single decision maker, in the sense that an increase in risk aversion of one household member does
not necessarily increase risk aversion of the household. [For an analysis of a two-period, collective
model of the household with uncertainty see Mazzocco (2004)].
It should be noted that our assumption of egoistical preferences is not crucial. Actually, Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene (2006) show that under caring preferences of the form where female’s
instantaneous utility is Uf(cf,l f)+ψfUm(cm,l m) and male’s utility is Um(cm,l m)+ψmUf(cf,l f),
with 0 <ψ f,ψm ≤ 1 denoting the caring parameters, the utility function of the household can be
written down as for the case of egotistical preferences, after a re-deﬁnition of Pareto weights. The
new relative weight on female’s utility Uf(cf,l f) would be ˆ μ ≡ (μ +( 1− μ)ψm)/(1 + μψf +( 1−
μ)ψm). Note that this weight converges to 0.5a sψf and ψm converge to 1, for all values of μ.
We now present the ﬁrst-order conditions to the maximization problem (2.9)-(2.11). As explained
above, the collective model of the household implies full risk-sharing within the household, i.e., the
ratio of marginal utilities of consumption equals relative Pareto weights and is thus independent
of the realized vector of employment shocks. That is,
μUf
c =( 1− μ)Um
c . (2.12)
This equation deﬁnes the individual risk-sharing rules, which, for a given level of household con-
sumption, specify how much is consumed by each of its members. It is straightforward to show
that the derivative of the risk-sharing rules is positive and given by the product of the household’s
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and the individual’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk tolerance.7
Therefore, the member of the household showing higher risk tolerance will be the one absorbing
most of the variation in total household consumption. (In Appendix IV we present the derivatives
of the risk-sharing rules for the case of CRRA utility functions.)












≥ wmsm with inequality if lm =1 . (2.14)










The ﬁrst-order condition to savings is,
Uf
c = β(1 + r)

s 
πs |s Uf 
c if a  > ¯ a (2.16)
Uf
c ≥ β(1 + r)

s 
πs |s Uf 
c if a  = a. (2.17)
7Risk tolerance is deﬁned as the reciprocal of risk aversion.
10We can now present some properties of the value function and optimal decision rules for a house-
hold with Pareto weight μ ∈ M. (We present the proofs for the case bf = bm = 0, but it is
straightforward to show that the results hold for the case of positive beneﬁts, provided wili ≥ bi
for i = f,m, i.e., earnings are higher than unemployment beneﬁts.)
Proposition 1. Assume A1 – A3, w > 0, (1 + r) > 0, β(1 + r) ≤ 1. Then:
(a) V (s,a,μ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in a. Decision rules cf(s,a;μ),
cm(s,a;μ), lf(s,a;μ),l m(s,a;μ) and a (s,a;μ) are continuous in a and strictly positive.
(b) Decision rules for consumption, cf(s,a;μ) and cm(s,a;μ), are strictly increasing in a.
Decision rules for savings, a (s,a;μ), and leisure, lf(sf =1 ,s m,a;μ), lm(sm =1 ,s f,a;μ),
are increasing in a.
(c) Decision rules for consumption are increasing in the own employment shock: cj(sj =
1,s i,a;μ) ≥ cj(sj =0 ,s i,a;μ).
(d) Decision rules for leisure are increasing in the spouse’s employment shock: lj(sj =1 ,s i =
1,a) ≥ lj(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a;μ).
(e) If β(1+r) ≤ 1, then for all a ∈ [a,a], a (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a;μ) ≤ a (with strict inequality
if a <a<a and β(1 + r) < 1).
Proof: See the Appendix.
We now present some results on the asymptotic properties of the consumption program, savings
and labor supply of a household with Pareto weight μ, for diﬀerent values of wages, (wf,wm),
and of the interest rate, r. More speciﬁcally, we extend results by Marcet, Obiols-Homs and
Weil (2007) for the bachelor household to our two-person, collective household model. We also
extend the results to non-homogeneous utility functions. With this aim, let us denote by ˜ a(μ) the
minimum level of asset holdings for which both spouses within a household with Pareto weight
μ will stop supplying labor. The value ˜ a(μ) is pinned down as follows. First, since utility is
separable in consumption and leisure, we can plug (2.12) into (2.14) and thus rewrite the ﬁrst-














with inequality if lm =1 . (2.19)
Deﬁne  Ui
l as the marginal utility of leisure for individual i = f,m,a tli = 1. Also, deﬁne
 Uf


















c (μ). Let  ci(μ) be the level of consumption for which the corresponding
marginal utility of consumption equals  Ui
c(μ). Then the level of asset holding ˜ a(μ) mentioned








It can easily be checked that at  a(μ), equations (2.10) – (2.14) are satisﬁed for all possible real-
izations of sf and sm if consumption levels equal  cf(μ) and  cm(μ), hours worked equal zero and
asset holdings remain constant. In the case that β(1+r) = 1, equation (2.16) is satisﬁed, because
consumption is constant. Hence, if β(1 + r) = 1, optimal decision rules are
ci(s, a(μ);μ)= ci(μ) (2.22)
li(s, a(μ);μ) = 1 (2.23)
a (s, a(μ);μ)= a(μ), (2.24)
for i = f,m and for all s ∈ S×S. Thus, if the household ever reaches  a(μ), it will maintain a con-
stant consumption stream without ever working. For lower interest rates, constant consumption
does not satisfy the FOC for asset holdings, and the household never reaches  a(μ). The following
proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 2: Assume A1 – A3, a> a(μ), w > 0 and (1 + r) > 0. Then:
(a) If β(1 + r) ≤ 1, for any a ≤  a(μ), a (s,a;μ) ≤  a(μ).
(b) If β(1 + r) = 1, for any a ≥  a(μ) and any s we have a (s,a;μ)=a, lf(s,a;μ)=1 ,
lm(s,a;μ) = 1 and cf(s,a;μ)+cm(s,a;μ)=arsuch that μU
f
c =( 1− μ) Um
c .
(c) If β(1 + r)=1a n da ≤  a(μ), then at
a.s. −→  a(μ),c i
t
a.s. −→  ci(μ), li
t
a.s. −→ 1,i = f,m.
Proof: See the Appendix.
It follows that in the case β(1+r) < 1 the household can reach any value of asset holdings from any
initial capital stock in ﬁnite time, and a stationary distribution arises in the long run. Moreover,
in the case β(1 + r) = 1 and a ≤  a(μ), capital accumulation in the long run is bounded and it
converges asymptotically to  a(μ). This is in contrast to the case of inelastic labor supply where
savings asymptotically grow to inﬁnity if β(1+r) = 1. As it should be apparent from these results,
the endogenous labor-leisure decision changes the asymptotic behavior of consumption and assets
with respect to the inelastic labor case by removing income uncertainty. When household wealth
is high enough, labor supply equals zero and thus employment shocks no longer aﬀect household
income. Hence, under non-stochastic income, unbounded asset accumulation is no longer optimal
under β(1 + r)=1 .
12Finally, note that if we set a>maxμ∈M  a(μ) and choose initial capital holdings for all households
with relative Pareto weight μ such that a0(μ) ≤  a(μ), then the upper limit on capital is never
binding. In other words, under these conditions the upper bound on asset holdings, which was
imposed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the value function, does not bind.
3 Stationary Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
We deﬁne now a stationary equilibrium with incomplete markets in the collective household econ-
omy. Let ψ(B;μ) be a probability measure describing the mass of households with ﬁxed Pareto
weight μ at each point in the state space X, where ψ(B;μ) is deﬁned on the Borel sigma algebra
B. Denote by P(s,a,B;μ) the probability that a household with Pareto weight μ at state (s,a)





Πs |s Ia (s,a;μ)∈Ba,
where I is an indicator function taking on a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise, and
Bs and Ba are the projections of B on S × S and [a,a] respectively. Note that these transition
functions will in general diﬀer across households with diﬀerent Pareto weights μ. We are now
ready to deﬁne the equilibrium concept for our model.
Deﬁnition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in the econ-
omy with collective households is a list of functions
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1) For given prices, taxes and beneﬁts, V is the solution to (2.9) – (2.11), and cf(s,a;μ),
cm(s,a;μ), lf(s,a;mu),l m(s,a;μ) and a (s,a;μ) are the associated optimal policy functions.
2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions (2.2) – (2.4).


















sm[1 − lm(s,a;μ)]dψdG. (3.3)




P(s,a,B;μ)dψ for all B ∈B . (3.4)
135) The government budget is balanced: q
f
0bf + qm
0 bm = τf ¯ wfLf + τm ¯ wmLm.
Under assumptions A 1–A 3the interest rate in the stationary equilibrium under incomplete
markets must be such that β(1 + r) < 1. This implies that the equilibrium capital-labor ratio
under incomplete markets is higher than under complete markets.
3.1 Stationary Equilibrium with Complete Markets
In the complete markets economy households can trade a set of Arrow securities which pay contin-
gent on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks of both spouses.8 It is then straightforward to
show that in a stationary equilibrium the interest rate must be such that β(1+r) = 1. In addition,
marginal utilities of consumption are equalized across states and periods, which in conjunction
with assumption A2 implies that female and male consumption levels are independent of the
vector of the household’s employment shocks s =( sf,s m) and constant over time. In a stationary
equilibrium with complete markets the capital-labor ratio K/L and optimal household decision
rules are uniquely determined, whereas the absolute values of K and L are not pinned down: in
fact, there are inﬁnitely many diﬀerent distributions of households that generate pairs of aggre-
gate capital K and aggregate labor L which are all consistent with the equilibrium capital-labor
ratio. Hence, when comparing the stationary complete markets equilibrium with the incomplete
markets economy, we must choose an equilibrium selection mechanism in the complete markets
economy. An obvious candidate is the steady state equilibrium that arises after the transition
from the incomplete markets economy. That is, when markets are completed, we compute the
long-run equilibrium using the stationary equilibrium of the incomplete markets economy as initial
conditions.9
3.2 Parameterization and Calibration
3.2.1 Parameterization









1 − γi for i = f,m, (3.5)
where ϕi
c and ϕi
l are parameters (ϕ
f
c is normalized to one) and σi is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion of an individual of gender i. It must be noted that in the model with collective households
8See Appendix II for a complete characterization of this economy.
9Pijoan-Mas (2006) contains a detailed description of the computational algorithm for an Aiyagari-Huggett
economy without public insurance and with ex-ante identical, same-gender individuals.
14—and contrary to the model with bachelor households— the Frisch elasticity of labor supply of
an individual of gender i depends not only on parameter γi, but is also a function of variables
and parameters that aﬀect the expected, intra-household earnings diﬀerential through the Pareto
weight (see Appendix III for a derivation of Frisch elasticities in the collective household economy).
Also, as anticipated above, a household’s risk aversion is determined by individual preferences for
risk and by the household sharing rule μ. It is only when the two household members share the
same preferences for risk, i.e., σf = σm, that the household’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
becomes independent of Pareto weights (see Appendix IV for a derivation of the household’s
coeﬃcient of risk aversion).
Technology As written above, the production takes place according to the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology, F(K,L)=KαL1−α, where labor is L ≡ λLm +( 1− λ)Lf. Parameter α
is the capital share of income and λ pins down relative gross wages, since wf/wm =( 1− λ)/λ.
Pareto weights We will make the following simplifying assumption on the distribution of Pareto
weights over the population, G. In our benchmark economy we assume that all households are
ex-ante identical and have a relative Pareto weight equal to 0.5. This amounts to assuming a
degenerate distribution over the vector z so that females and males have a Pareto weight exactly
equal to 0.5 in all households. It should be noted, however, that a Pareto weight of 0.5 would
endogenously arise under caring preferences of the form discussed above for high enough caring
parameters ψf and ψm.
We also need the derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to x, μ1(x,z), in order
to pin down the Frisch elasticities of labor supply. We will set the value of this derivative using
empirical estimates of the sharing rule. We detail this empirical evidence and our procedure below.
3.2.2 Parameter Values




l ,σ f,σ m,γ f and γm. There
are three technology parameters: α, λ and δ. The two transition matrices Πf and Πm contain
four parameters. The parameter a deﬁnes the minimum level of asset holdings for any household,
i.e. the borrowing limit. The public insurance program is described by tax rates and the level of
unemployment beneﬁts: τf,τm,b f and bm (one of the tax rates is determined from the balanced-
budget constraint). Finally, we have to pin down the derivative of the Pareto weight function
with respect to x, μ1.
The length of a period in the model is set to one quarter. We will normalize ϕ
f
c to 1, which
is equivalent to dividing both instantaneous utility functions by this parameter. The borrowing
limit is set to zero, i.e. households are restricted to hold non-negative asset holdings at all times.
In order to calibrate the remaining parameters we choose a set of statistics from aggregate and
15household survey data for the U.S. economy, such that the incomplete markets equilibrium of our
collective household economy matches these targets. Using estimates for the quarterly capital
depreciation rate and the capital share of income, we set δ =0 .025 and α =0 .36, which are both
standard values in the macro literature.
In our benchmark economy, we impose equal labor income tax rates for females and males, τf =
τm. Consequently, the value for λ can be pinned down using a priori information on the gender
wage gap. We set this parameter equal to 0.575, which implies a ratio of female to male wages
of 0.74. This corresponds to the gender wage gap in 2004 as reported by Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2010) for the U.S. economy.
Transition probabilities for idiosyncratic employment shocks are assumed to be identical for fe-
males and males. While the female unemployment rate averaged 1.5% percentage points higher
than the male rate during the period 1960-1980, the female-male gap disappeared after the early
1980’s. Even though male unemployment rates generally increase more than female rates dur-
ing recessions —mainly due to the fact that men dominate industries like manufacturing and
construction— the average diﬀerence between female and male unemployment rates over the pe-
riod 1980-2009 is practically zero. Explanations for the narrowing gap in unemployment rates
point to the relative increase of service-oriented industries which employ a large proportion of
women. We use the following transition probabilities which match an average employment rate






for i = f,m. (3.6)
Our assumption that within-household unemployment shocks are uncorrelated can be supported
from SIPP data. Indeed, from the April 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation, which covers 48 months between April 1996 and March 2000, it is possible to compute the
within-household unemployment correlation. Since information on occupation is available in these
data, unemployment correlations can be computed both for households where husband and wife
report diﬀerent occupation and for households reporting the same occupation. Within-household
unemployment correlation in the ﬁrst group is 0.05, and 0.23 in the second. It should be noted,
however, that the fraction of households reporting same occupation for husband and wife is only
3.2% of the total. (For a detailed explanation on the calculation of these correlations, see Shore
and Sinai 2010.)
The remaining twelve parameters are set such that our model matches the following targets:
10These transition probabilities are similar to the ones used in the previous literature, see e.g. Imrohoroglu (1989),
Krusell and Smith (1998) and Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007).
161. Married females’ average hours of work if working represent 28% of their discretionary time.
Married males’ average hours of work if working represent 40% of their discretionary time.11
2. Estimates for males’ Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the presence of potentially binding
borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Domeij and Flod´ en 2006). Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) ﬁnd that for females this elasticity is 3-4 times larger than for males. We
will target values of 0.37 and 1.2 for males and females, respectively.
3. Non-gender-based estimates of the average coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion have yielded
values ranging from 1 to 10. When gender is taken into account, females are found to be
more risk-averse than males.12 We set individual preferences for risk at σf = 2 and σm =1 .5,
which yield an average coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for the collective household of 1.68.
4. The capital-to-output ratio is around 10.
5. The ratio of annual hours worked by single working women to annual hours worked by single
working men is 1861/2095 = 89 percent.13 We will match this value using the equilibrium
of the bachelor economy.
6. The average net unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate in the United States is roughly 30
percent (see OECD 2010). We will set bf and bm to match this target as fractions of the
average wage income both for females and males. Labor income tax rates are set to balance
the budget constraint of the government.
7. The derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to the expected income diﬀerential,
μ1, is set to match the sharing rule estimates presented in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori
and Lechene (1994).
As for the last target, Browning et al. (1994) use data on couples with no children to estimate
the parameters of the sharing rule: they ﬁnd that the wife’s share in total expenditure increases
modestly with her share in household income. Speciﬁcally, increasing the wife’s contribution
to household income from 25% to 75% (holding total expenditure constant) raises her share in
total expenditure by about 2.3%. In addition, the impact of total expenditure on the wife’s
share is positive and sizable. For instance, an increase in total expenditures (holding her relative
contribution to household income ﬁxed) by 60% raises the wife’s share by about 12%. We use these
11Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008) use PSID data from 1968 to 1996 to compute mean annual hours worked
if working for married females and males; he ﬁnds values of 1660 and 2312 respectively. We make the assumption
that the disposable daily time endowment is 16 hours.
12For a recent study of risk aversion and gender see Maestripieri, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), who ﬁnd a
negative relation between testosterone levels and risk aversion.
13See Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008).
17empirical estimates to ascertain the value of μ1|μ=0.5 as follows. Starting from the benchmark
equilibrium and μ =0 .5, we increase the value of x — e.g. by raising wf/wm — and then compute
the new Pareto weight, say ˜ μ, such that the implied increase in the wife’s relative contribution to
household income yields an increase in the wife’s share of total expenditure, cf/(cf + cm), that
matches the one implied by the sharing rule as estimated in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori
and Lechene (1994).14 Given the imputed value ˜ μ, we then use a linear approximation to obtain
μ1|μ=0.5.
Table 1 presents parameter values for our benchmark economy.
Table 1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Female risk aversion σf 2 Utility weight ϕf
c 1
Male risk aversion σm 1.5 Utility weight ϕm
c 2.15
Regulates Frisch elasticity (f) γf 2 Utility weight ϕ
f
l 2.662
Regulates Frisch elasticity (m) γm 3.75 Utility weight ϕm
l 0.911
Pareto weight μ 0.5 Discount factor β 0.989
Derivative Pareto weight μ1 0.038 Unemployment beneﬁts (f) bf 0.083
Elasticity of output to capital α 0.36 Unemployment beneﬁts (m) bm 0.161
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025 Relative wages λ 0.575
3.3 Steady-state Equilibrium
Aggregate variables in the steady-state equilibrium with incomplete markets are presented in
Table 2 below, both for the collective and the bachelor household economies. Note that the
two economies diﬀer only in the insurance opportunities available to individuals, and, therefore,
diﬀerences in aggregates variables reﬂect the equilibrium eﬀects of intra-household risk sharing.
Aggregate capital is higher in the bachelor economy, as the lack of insurance from the family in
this economy leads individuals to rely more on savings. Aggregate work eﬀort by females and
males rank diﬀerently in the two economies. While male labor is higher in the collective economy,
females work more in the bachelor economy. In this latter economy, females are relatively poorer
and, since they lack the consumption insurance provided by the family, must supply more hours
of work. On the contrary, males ﬁnance part of female consumption in the collective economy
(even with equal Pareto weights) and must therefore work longer hours. Total labor is higher
in the bachelor household economy. We will elaborate further on this below. The capital-labor
ratio is lower in the economy with intra-household risk sharing, yielding a higher interest rate as
compared to the economy with bachelor households. Finally, production is higher in the economy
with bachelor households, which results from larger aggregate capital and labor.
14When computing the wife’s shares of income and expenditures, we take the average over all households.
18Table 2. Steady-state equilibrium: Aggregate Variables
Y K L K/L Lf Lm 1+r
Collective household economy 1.2723 12.6820 0.3490 36.3351 0.2799 0.4001 1.1115
Bachelor household economy 1.3081 13.0410 0.3588 36.3452 0.3363 0.3754 1.1109
Notes: This table presents the steady-state equilibrium with incomplete markets in the economies with and
without intra-household risk sharing.
3.3.1 Policy Functions
The relative contribution of households across the wealth and employment distribution to the
diﬀerences in economic aggregates shown in Table 2 are now explored. Labor supply and saving
policy functions of collective households are presented in Figures 1 and 3, respectively. The
top panel of Figure 1 plots hours worked by females and males in households where the two
spouses are employed. Hours decrease with household wealth, and the rate of decline is higher
for females, implying that they work relatively less in asset-rich households. As asset holdings
approach the borrowing limit, policy functions for hours bend upwards, capturing the fact that
asset-poor households use labor supply to smooth consumption more intensively. Hours worked
by females and males when the spouse is unemployed are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure
1 (for convenience, we plot them along with those emerging when the two spouses are employed).
First, hours supplied increase if the spouse is unemployed, both for females and males, and the
increase is especially marked for females in asset-poor households. For example, a female in a
household with no assets will supply almost half of her available time to work if the spouse is
unemployed, as opposed to 0.37 when the spouse is employed, which represents a decline of more
than 25%.
We now display the eﬀects of intra-household risk sharing on hours worked at diﬀerent levels
of asset holdings and employment shocks. Figure 2 (top panel) plots excess hours worked by
two bachelors (each with wealth a/2) over hours worked by a two-person collective household
(with wealth a). For all households where only the male is employed, intra-household risk sharing
increases household hours. For households where the female is employed, with the exception of low-
wealth households with the male unemployed, intra-household risk sharing decreases household
hours. The bottom panel of the Figure shows the average of these excess hours across households
along the employment distribution. As it is apparent, the eﬀects of intra-household risk sharing
on hours are strongest among wealth-poor households.
Savings policy functions in the collective model are presented in Figure 3 (for convenience we plot
the net change in asset holdings a  − a). Households where the two spouses are employed choose
positive net savings at the borrowing limit and at all values in the support of the equilibrium
19distribution of assets. For households with at least one of the spouses unemployed, net savings
are zero at the borrowing limit and negative for a large set of asset holdings. Negative net savings
are larger in households where the male is unemployed. The saving eﬀects of intra-household risk
sharing at diﬀerent levels of asset holdings are shown in Figure 4. The top panel of Figure 4 plots
excess savings of two bachelors (each with wealth a/2) over a two-person collective household
(with wealth a). The bottom panel plots the average of excess savings across employment shocks.
Clearly, although risk sharing aﬀects the savings decisions of all households across the wealth
distribution, its eﬀects are strongest among wealth-poor households.
3.4 Aggregate Precautionary Savings and Precautionary Labor Supply
We now move to assessing the consequences of completing markets, and to how these depend on
the ability to share risks within the family. As already noted, aggregate precautionary savings in
our framework are small, regardless of whether intra-household risk sharing is available or not.
This is a consequence of our speciﬁcation of the income process —employment/unemployment
shocks coupled with unemployment beneﬁts— which lacks the necessary persistence to generate
large incentives to save for precautionary reasons. However, a comparison of precautionary savings
and work eﬀort across the economies with collective and bachelor households will help us assess
the implications of intra-household risk sharing.
In Table 3 we present aggregate precautionary savings and precautionary labor supply in the
collective model relative to those in the bachelor model. That is, we report Δcol./Δbach., where Δi
for i = col.,bach. denotes precautionary aggregates (savings and work eﬀort) under households of
type i. For our baseline parameter values, precautionary savings —measured as the fraction of
capital held for precautionary motives— in the economy with collective households represent 55%
of those in the economy with bachelor households. That is, access to insurance from the family
reduces aggregate precautionary savings by 45%.
Aggregate precautionary work eﬀort is equally measured by the fraction of hours worked for
precautionary motives, i.e., (LIM −LCM)/LIM, where LIM and LCM denote hours worked under
incomplete and complete markets, respectively. Both for females and males, aggregate work eﬀort
is higher in the complete markets economy, implying negative aggregate precautionary labor under
both households arrangements. This is a consequence of an ex-post wealth eﬀect operating in the
incomplete markets economy. That is, conditional on being employed, individuals work relatively
less hours in the incomplete markets economy because the inability to buy employment insurance
makes them ex-post richer. Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) were the ﬁrst to uncover the
implications of this ex-post wealth eﬀect for aggregate precautionary labor in the Aiyagari-Huggett
model. In Table 3 we report precautionary labor in the collective household economy relative to
20that in the bachelor economy. The percentage increase in aggregate female labor resulting from
completing markets in the collective household economy is only 37% of the increase under bachelor
households. The increase in aggregate male labor represents 75% of the increase under bachelor
households. That is, the ex-post wealth eﬀect is weaker in the collective economy.
Table 3. Relative Precautionary Savings and Precautionary Work Eﬀort
KLL f Lm
Δcol./Δbach. 0.5552 0.5586∗ 0.3769∗ 0.7502∗
Notes: Δi ≡ 1 − CMi/IMi for i = col.,bach., represent the fraction of capital held and hours
worked for precautionary motives in an economy with households of type i. That is, CMi and
IMi refer to aggregates under complete and incomplete markets, respectively. * For the case of
aggregate labor, both Δcol. and Δbach. are negative. I.e., both in the collective and the bachelor
economies aggregate work eﬀort is higher under complete markets than under incomplete markets.
4 Intra-household Risk Sharing and the Crowding out Eﬀects of
Unemployment Beneﬁts
In our model economy there are two insurance mechanisms —in addition to public unemploy-
ment beneﬁts— households can use to smooth consumption across unemployment spells: savings
and labor supply. In the economy with intra-household risk sharing, spousal labor supply is a
potentially important instrument to smooth consumption upon a spousal’s unemployment spell.
Changes in the level of public insurance call forth adjustments in the demand for other forms of
insurance. The extent to which the ability to share risks within the household shapes the crowding
out eﬀects of public unemployment insurance is explored in this section.
4.1 Household Financial Assets and the Generosity of Unemployment Beneﬁts
An implication of our model, as of any model with uninsurable income risk, is that household
asset holdings increase with income uncertainty. Engen and Gruber (2001) exploit the variation
in generosity of unemployment insurance schedules across U.S. states to test this implication and
to estimate the extent of the precautionary savings motive. Since the level of unemployment
beneﬁts is directly correlated with household income risk, this variation can be used to measure
the extent to which beneﬁts crowd out household ﬁnancial assets. These authors use data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) —which follows a cross section of households
over a period of 2.5 years— in combination with data on unemployment beneﬁts available to
21these households under their state/date beneﬁts system. They regress household ﬁnancial assets
(normalized by average household income) on the generosity of beneﬁts, controlling for a vector
of demographic and economic characteristics of the household. The elasticity of the average
household’s ﬁnancial assets-to-income ratio with respect to unemployment beneﬁts is −0.28. That
is, reducing the replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁts by 50% rises the household’s assets-
to-income ratio by 14%.
In this subsection, we use our model economy to compute the elasticity of the average assets-to-
income ratio with respect to unemployment beneﬁts. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. On
the one hand, we use it as a test for our model with collective households to match this estimated
measure of the precautionary savings motive. On the other hand, we also compute this elasticity
using the bachelor household model and assess by how much it overestimates the precautionary
motive. In this latter model there is no intra-household risk sharing and, therefore, variation in
unemployment beneﬁts amounts to larger changes in household income risk and, consequently, to
larger eﬀects on savings.
In order to mimic the empirical exercise conducted by Engen and Gruber (2001) we proceed as
follows. Since these authors rely on the exogenous variation in unemployment beneﬁts for work-
ers living in diﬀerent states in the U.S., we interpret the level of unemployment beneﬁts in our
benchmark economy as the average value across all states. Then, we vary these beneﬁts and com-
pute asset-to-income ratios by solving the model keeping equilibrium prices unchanged, a strategy
which is in accordance with the existence of a unique ﬁnancial and labor market across states.
However, Pareto weights and the distribution of households over asset holdings are let to change
with unemployment beneﬁts. Thus, our exercise compares the diﬀerential asset-to-income ratio
of households across states that provide these households with diﬀering unemployment beneﬁts,
which is exactly what Engen and Gruber (2001) do in their empirical work. The results of this
exercise are presented in Table 4. As shown there, our collective household model accounts fairly
well for the empirical elasticity estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001). On the contrary, the
bachelor household model, which by construction abstracts from within-household risk sharing,
overpredicts this elasticity by a factor of more than three. The economy with intra-household risk
sharing yields an elasticity of the asset-income ratio of −0.29, against an elasticity of −0.94 in the
bachelor household economy. Intra-household risk sharing plays thus a key role in the determina-
tion of the elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to beneﬁts. This is evidence of the
importance of this informal source of insurance when assessing the crowding out eﬀects of public
unemployment insurance.
The success of our collective model at matching this empirical elasticity, −0.29 in the model
against −0.28 in the data, can be interpreted as providing support to the view that the two-person
household embeds the most important informal insurance arrangement available to individuals.
22Indeed, some authors have emphasized the irrelevant insurance role played by the extended family,
friends and other social networks (see, e.g., Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston 2008).
Table 4. Unemployment Beneﬁts and Financial Assets
Elasticity of average assets-to-income
ratio w.r.t. replacement rate
Data (Engen and Gruber 2001) −0.28
Collective Household Economy −0.29
Bachelor Household Economy −0.94
Notes: This table shows how household asset holdings respond to the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts.
4.2 Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance
In the face of unemployment risk and capital market imperfections, spousal labor supply becomes
a potential source of household self-insurance. The change in a household member’s labor supply
induced by an unemployment spell of another household member —the added worker eﬀect— has
been largely studied in the empirical literature. Most of this literature has focused on the labor
supply response of married women to their husband’s unemployment spells. The main argument
in favor of restricting the attention to labor supply of women is that they are the secondary wage
earners in most households (according to Cullen and Gruber 2000, in 87% of married couples in
the U.S. the husband earns more and in 73% the husband works more hours).
Early literature on the added worker eﬀect (see Cullen and Gruber 2000 for a short review) has
singled out liquidity constraints as one of the main reasons married women increase hours worked
during their husband’s unemployment spells. Empirical estimates have however produced mixed
results, failing to ﬁnd strong support for this eﬀect.15 Cullen and Gruber (2000), using data
from the 1984-88 and 1990-92 panels of the Survey of Income Program Participation for married
couples aged between 25 and 54 years old, report means for wives’ monthly hours worked during
husbands’ spells of employment and unemployment, respectively. Conditional on working women,
these authors ﬁnd that the average amount of work per month of wives of unemployed husbands is
149 hours, as opposed to 132.4 hours worked by wives of employed husbands. When non working
15Stephens (2002) estimates the added worker eﬀect taking into account not only the current period of the
husband’s job loss but also the periods before and after a job loss. This author ﬁnds small pre-displacement eﬀects
but large, persistent post-displacement eﬀects.
23wives are included, i.e. those who work 0 hours, the change in average hours is small: 98.2 hours
for wives with an unemployed husband, against 97.9 hours for those with an employed husband.
In this section we use our model economy with collective households to study the response of female
labor supply to male’s unemployment spells in two groups of households. In order to highlight the
role of liquidity constraints on wives’ labor supply responses, we follow Zeldes (1989) in deﬁning
a household as liquidity constrained if its non-housing wealth is less than two months of average
income. Table 5 below reports the added worker eﬀect in our model economy. For the group of
liquidity-constrained households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8%
higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands, an increase comparable to that found
by Cullen and Gruber (2000) in their sample of working women. When all households are taken
into account the increase in hours is only 0.06%. That is, spousal labor supply is an important
insurance mechanism for wealth-poor households but not for the wealth rich.
Table 5. Female Labor Supply and Male Employment Status
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Employed Husband 173.1 145.1
Unemployed Husband 187.8 145.9
Notes: This table shows average monthly hours of work by working females in households with employed
and unemployed males in our baseline economy with collective households.
How eﬀective is wives’ labor supply as insurance against income ﬂuctuations due to husbands’
unemployment? In other words, what is the fraction of lost family income that is made up by the
wife’s response to the husband’s unemployment spell? To answer this question we compute, for
each level of asset holdings, a, the following fraction,
[hf(0,1,a) − hf(1,1,a)]wf
hm(1,1,a)wm − bm ,
where hf(0,1,a) denotes hours worked by a female with an unemployed husband and hf(1,1,a)
denotes female hours worked if the husband is employed. The denominator represents lost income
due to husband’s unemployment. The numerator is the increase in income due to the wife’s re-
sponse in hours. We then average out across asset holdings. For the group of liquidity-constrained
households (i.e., with asset holdings less than two months worth of income) we obtain that wives’
response makes up about 9% of lost family income, while this number is only 1% when we consider
all households. Households with high levels of asset holdings use savings to smooth consumption
upon husband’s unemployment rather than using spouse labor supply. Liquidity-constrained
households must rely, however, on spousal labor supply.
244.2.1 Spousal Labor Supply and the Generosity of Unemployment Beneﬁts
Some authors have argued that the ﬁnding of a moderate to nil added worker eﬀect may be partially
explained by the presence of public unemployment insurance schemes. That is, unemployment
payments during the husband’s unemployment spell crowd out wife’s labor supply. To quantify
this eﬀect, Cullen and Gruber (2000) estimate the response in wives’ hours of work during their
husbands’ spells of unemployment to changes in unemployment beneﬁts. They ﬁnd evidence of
a crowd out eﬀect, i.e., increasing the beneﬁts received by unemployed husbands reduces their
wives’ hours of work. Moreover, they also ﬁnd a diﬀerentially larger response of wives’ labor
supply among those households that are less able to smooth consumption through own savings.
We use our model economy to compute the crowding out of unemployment beneﬁts on wives’ labor
supply. Table 6 below presents the results of this exercise. A 50% reduction in unemployment
beneﬁts received by the husband increases wife’s hours by almost 5% for the group of liquidity-
constrained households. This increase is only 0.71% when all households are considered. The
relatively higher sensitivity of spousal labor supply to unemployment beneﬁts among liquidity-
constrained households found in our model in is line with the ﬁnding of Cullen and Gruber
(2000).16
Table 6. Unemployment Beneﬁts and Female Labor Supply During Male’s Unemployment Spells
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
10% reduction in bm +0.91% +0.14%
50% reduction in bm +4.97% +0.71%
Notes: This table shows the percentage increase in female labor supply upon a male’s unemployment spell
yielded by 10% and 50% reductions in unemployment beneﬁts in our baseline economy with collective
households.
Even though a direct comparison of our results with those estimated by Cullen and Gruber
(2000) is not straightforward, it seems that our model underpredicts the crowding out eﬀect of
unemployment beneﬁts on spouse labor supply. According to their estimates, a 50% reduction
in potential unemployment beneﬁts of the husband (75 USD per week) would imply an increase
in monthly hours worked by the wife (conditional on working) of 13.42 hours, which amounts to
an increase of about 9%. Our model predicts that a 50% reduction in beneﬁts receipt increases
16In order to compare the relative responsiveness of couples with diﬀering levels of assets these authors split their
sample of unemployment spells according to the age of the couple. Then, they interpret that households where the
two spouses are under 40 years of age are liquidity constrained.
25spouse labor supply, in the group of liquidity-constrained households, by 5%. It should be noted
however that the estimate in Cullen and Gruber is not statistically signiﬁcant, thus hindering the
assessment of our model’s predictions.
4.3 Consumption Loss Upon Unemployment
The loss of the job implies, under imperfect capital markets, a reduction in the level of individual
consumption. In the case of complete markets, there is no consumption loss upon an unemploy-
ment shock. In the opposite extreme case of bachelor individuals with no assets, unable to borrow
and with no entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts, the consumption loss is one hundred percent.
In intermediate cases with partial insurance, the degree of transmission of unemployment shocks
to consumption depends on factors such as the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, on the level
of accumulated wealth and on whether risks are shared within the household.
In this section we use our benchmark economy to assess the contribution of intra-household
risk sharing to individual consumption insurance, as measured by the degree of transmission of
unemployment shocks to consumption. We do so by comparing individual consumption losses upon
unemployment in the collective household model to those in the bachelor model. We compute the
percentage change in consumption upon unemployment,  c/c, for all asset holdings in the support
of the corresponding equilibrium distribution. In the collective economy, individual consumption
losses for females and males, both with an employed spouse and with an unemployed spouse, are
computed as,
−
cj(sj =1 ,s i,a) − cj(sj =0 ,s i,a)
cj(sj =1 ,s i,a)
for j = f,m, i = f,m and i  = j, both for si = 1 and si = 0. For the bachelor economy, individual
consumption losses upon unemployment are simply computed as, −(cj(1,a)−cj(0,a))/cj(1,a) for
j = f,m.
In Table 7 we report average individual consumption losses, both for the group of liquidity-
constrained individuals and for all individuals. We use the respective equilibrium asset and em-
ployment distributions to average out individual consumption losses. The results show that intra-
household risk sharing provides important consumption smoothing opportunities, especially for
liquidity-constrained individuals. Thus, the average consumption loss for a liquidity-constrained
female in the bachelor economy is −19.81%, against only −2.84% in the collective economy, which
is eight times smaller. For a liquidity-constrained male, intra-household risk sharing reduces the
consumption loss from −29.28% to −6.41%. These numbers imply that the family is an important
provider of consumption insurance for a signiﬁcant fraction of individuals.
26Table 7. Individual consumption loss upon unemployment
Collective Model Bachelor Model
Liquidity-constrained Liquidity-constrained
individuals All individuals individuals All individuals
Females,  cf/cf −2.84% −0.13% −19.81% −0.35%
Males,  cm/cm −6.41% −0.32% −29.28% −0.57%
Notes: This table presents individual insurance as measured by the percentage of consumption lost upon
an unemployment shock.
We now study household insurance by computing the fraction of income loss (due to an un-
employment shock) that translates into consumption loss. To do this we compute income and
consumption losses upon an unemployment shock for each household across the asset and em-
ployment distributions. Then, we average out the percentage of income loss that is transmitted
to consumption loss across all households. Table 8 presents our results under the two household
arrangements.
Table 8. Fraction of income loss that transmits to consumption loss
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Collective Household Economy 11.43% 0.66%
Bachelor Household Economy 32.82% 0.74%
Notes: This table presents household insurance as measured by the degree of transmission of the income
loss to consumption upon an unemployment shock.
It should be noted that, even in the collective household economy, the fraction of income loss that
transits to consumption loss in the group of liquidity-constrained households is non-negligible. For
an average household in this group, 11.43% of the household income lost due to an unemployment
shock is absorbed by consumption. This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008) about the degree of insurability of transitory income shocks. These
authors ﬁnd that the impact of these shocks on consumption is small when estimated from all
households in their sample, but it is found to be larger in the subsample of wealth-poor households
(these authors deﬁne a household as wealth poor if its wealth in the ﬁrst year this household is
observed is in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution of initial wealth). Their estimate of the
27degree of partial insurance of temporary shocks in the sample of low-wealth households is close to
0.2.
4.3.1 Consumption Loss and the Generosity of Unemployment Beneﬁts
We now turn to the sensitivity of household consumption losses upon unemployment with respect
to the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, and assess the extent to which our model economy
with collective households matches the empirical ﬁndings of Browning and Crossley (2001). These
authors use a Canadian panel data set to estimate how changes in household consumption following
a job loss vary with the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts. Their empirical exercise exploits
legislative changes to the unemployment insurance system introduced in 1993 and 1994, which
reduced the replacement rate by about ﬁve percentage points. In total, 19,000 individuals who had
experienced a job separation either before or after the policy reform where interviewed several
times after the job loss. Browning and Crossley (2001) obtain two main results. First, the
level of unemployment beneﬁts has small average eﬀects on household consumption loss upon
unemployment. In particular, a 10 percentage-point reduction in beneﬁts leads to an average
fall in consumption of 0.8%.17 Second, the consumption eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts are
not homogeneous across households. For instance, for the sub-sample of liquidity-constrained
households at the time of job separation these eﬀects are substantially larger. (These authors also
follow Zeldes (1989) in deﬁning a household as liquidity-constrained if its non-housing wealth is less
than two months of average disposal income.) These results show the importance of unemployment
beneﬁts as a consumption smoothing instrument for a large number of households. They also
highlight the importance of carrying out analyses which go beyond the representative agent model
and thus beyond estimating mean eﬀects.
Table 9 below presents the elasticities of consumption loss with respect to unemployment beneﬁts
in our model economy with and without intra-household risk sharing, and compares the results to
the estimates in Browning and Crossley (2001). Our quantitative exercise explicitly acknowledges
the panel dimension of the empirical exercise conducted by these authors. We compute the
relative change in consumption from the period prior to the unemployment shock to the period
in which the job separation is realized. Saving household decisions in the pre-unemployment
period are used for the computation of consumption when the unemployment shock hits. That is,
consumption of an individual of gender j in the period before unemployment is cj(sj =1 ,s i,a)
and consumption at the time of the job loss is cj(sj =0 ,s i,a  ), where a  = a (sj =1 ,s i,a). We
then weigh consumption levels in both periods using the stationary distribution of employment
17Gruber (1997) uses U.S. data on food consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and ﬁnds
a larger mean eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on consumption losses upon unemployment. This author estimates
that a 10 percentage-point increase in beneﬁts reduces the fall in consumption by 2.65%.
28shocks for the spouse (in the collective economy). Our collective household economy accounts well
for the elasticity of consumption loss with respect to beneﬁts in the group of liquidity-constrained
households. It however underestimates this elasticity for the whole sample of households.
Table 9. Elasticity of Household Consumption Loss to Unemployment Beneﬁts
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Data (Browning and Crossley 2001) −0.0922 −0.05
Collective Household Economy −0.0827 −0.0013
Bachelor Household Economy −0.2044 −0.0024
Notes: This table presents the sensitivity of household consumption loss upon unemployment with respect
to the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts.
It is important to note that estimates by Browning and Crossley (2001) of the elasticity of house-
hold consumption loss upon unemployment with respect to unemployment beneﬁts use Canadian
data, while our baseline parameter values have been chosen to match some U.S. stylized facts.
Since it is likely that this elasticity diﬀers when evaluated at U.S. equilibrium values, our exercise
in this section should not be taken as an attempt at matching the estimated Canadian elasticity.
It serves, however, to shed further light on the role of intra-household risk sharing. The elasticity
predicted by the bachelor economy, 0.2044, is more than two times the elasticity under collective
households.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we assess quantitatively the eﬀects of intra-household risk sharing on savings and
labor supply within a model of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. With this purpose, we present a
model economy where households are formed by a female and a male, who make collective decisions
and lack access to a complete capital market. Our model is a dynamic version of the standard
collective model of the household developed by Chiappori and co-authors since the 1980’s, which
assumes eﬃcient risk sharing within the household. Equipped with this model, we then ask about
the quantitative eﬀects of this informal insurance arrangement on individual and aggregate savings
and labor supplies, on the extent of the precautionary motive and on the crowding out eﬀects of
public insurance. In light of our results, we conclude that intra-household risk sharing has large
29quantitative eﬀects on all these margins explored. Importantly, we ﬁnd that our model economy
accounts for key elasticities of savings and spousal labor supply with respect to unemployment
beneﬁts, as estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001) and Cullen and Gruber (2000), respectively.
We also show that standard models, which abstract from intra-household risk sharing, fail to
match those elasticities. A conclusion we draw from the exercise in this paper is that ignoring
risk sharing at the level of the household introduces an important bias not only on the extent of
the precautionary motive but also on the distortionary eﬀects of public insurance programs.
The model we present in this paper can be used to address a number of related questions. In
particular, we plan to use versions of this model to shed further light on a recent debate about
gender-based taxation. A number of scholars have argued in favor of taxing females and males
diﬀerently on the grounds of their diﬀerent elasticities of labor supply. The interplay of income
tax rates with Pareto weights within the household is bound to introduce tradeoﬀs that have been
so far overlooked in this debate. A diﬀerent extension that is worth pursuing is the consideration
of permanent income shocks when household members have no-commitment to future household
allocations. Under no commitment, variability in Pareto weights is magniﬁed relative to the
commitment case. It is then to be expected that the quantitative eﬀects of intra-household risk
sharing we found in this paper increase under the assumption of no-commitment. Finally, in light
of recent results on the degree of household insurability against diﬀerent types of shocks and the
evolution of consumption and income inequality (see, e.g., Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston 2008),
we need models that can account for the observed ability of households to insure diﬀerent kinds
of risks. Models with two-person households and perfect risk sharing within the household are a
ﬁrst step in this direction.
6 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) The proof of this part follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem and Theorem 3 and
Corollary 2 in Denardo (1967).
(b) Case 1: We consider ﬁrst values of a such that a (s,a) >a(interior solution).
(i) cf(s,a), cm(s,a) are strictly increasing in a. Take the envelope condition (using A2):
Va(s,a;μ)=μUf
c (cf(s,a),·)(1 + r)=( 1− μ)Um
c (cm(s,a),·)(1 + r). (6.1)
Since V (s,a,μ) is strictly concave, Va(s,a;μ) is strictly decreasing in a. It follows that
Ui
c(ci(s,a;μ),·), i = f,m, must be strictly decreasing in a as well. Since Ui is strictly
concave in ci, the result follows.
30(ii) a (s,a) increasing in a. By contradiction: suppose there were values a1,a 2 such that a2 >a 1
and a (s,a 2) <a  (s,a 1). Then since cf(s,a) is strictly increasing in a (as shown before),
it has to be that cf(s,a  (s,a 2)) <c f(s,a  (s,a 1)). As utility is separable and the marginal




c (cf(s ,a  (s,a 2)),·)

>β (1 + r)E

Uf
c (cf(s ,a  (s,a 1)),·)

.
However, the Euler equation then implies U
f
c (cf(s,a 2),·) >U
f
c (cf(s,a 1),·), which is a con-
tradiction because cf(s,a 2) >c f(s,a 1).





≥ wisi, for i = f,m, (6.2)
with inequality if li = 1. Since ci(s,a) is strictly increasing in a, Ui
c(ci(s,a),·) is strictly
decreasing in a. Hence, Ui
l(·,l i(si =1 ,s j,a)) has to be decreasing in a, too. This implies
that li(si =1 ,s j,a) is increasing in a.
Case 2: Consider now values of a such that a (s,a)=a (non-interior solution).
In this case the budget constraint reads
cf(s,a)+cm(s,a)=wf(1 − lf(s,a))sf + wm(1 − lm(s,a))sm +( 1+r)a − a. (6.3)
The proof is by contradiction:
(i) Suppose that lf(s,a) is decreasing in a and lm(s,a) is increasing in a. From intratemporal
optimality (6.2) it follows that cf(s,a) must be decreasing in a and that cm(s,a) must be
increasing in a. This is a contradiction with (2.12).
(ii) Suppose that lf(s,a) is increasing in a and lm(s,a) is decreasing in a. From intratemporal
optimality (6.2) it follows that cf(s,a) must be increasing in a and that cm(s,a) must be
decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with (2.12).
(iii) Suppose that lf(s,a) and lm(s,a) are decreasing in a. From intratemporal optimality (6.2)
it follows that cf(s,a) and cm(s,a) must be decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with
(6.3).
Hence, lf(s,a) and lm(s,a) are increasing in a, and (6.3) implies that cf and cm are strictly
increasing in a.
(c) Case 1: Consider values of a such that a (s,a) >a(interior solution).
31As in the proof of Lemma 1 in Huggett (1993), it can be shown by induction that Va(sj =1 ,s i,a) ≤
Va(sj =0 ,s i,a), ∀si, using the assumption that πi
1|1 ≥ πi
1|0. The result then follows immediately
from the envelope condition (6.1).
Case 2: We consider now values of a such that a (s,a)=a (non-interior solution).
First we show that cj(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a) ≥ cj(sj =0 ,s i =0 ,a). Evaluating the budget constraint
at these two household’s employment shocks we obtain,
cj(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a)+ci(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a)+a − (1 + r)a − wj(1 − lj(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a) )=0
cj(sj =0 ,s i =0 ,a)+ci(sj =0 ,s i =0 ,a)+a − (1 + r)a =0 . (6.4)
This implies that cj(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a)+ci(sj =1 ,s i =0 ,a) ≥ cj(sj =0 ,s i =0 ,a)+ci(sj =0 ,s i =
0,a). The result follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption, (2.12).
We now show that cj(sj =1 ,s i =1 ,a) ≥ cj(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a). Using the budget constraint and
eliminating terms we get,
cj(sj = si =1 ,a)+ci(sj = si =1 ,a) − wi(1 − li(sj = si =1 ,a)) − wj(1 − lj(sj = si =1 ,a))
= cj(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a)+ci(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a) − wi(1 − li(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a)). (6.5)
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ci(sj =1 ,s i =1 ,a) <c i(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a). Intratemporal
optimality (6.2) then requires li(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a) >l i(sj =1 ,s i =1 ,a), and (2.12) implies
cj(sj =1 ,s i =1 ,a) <c j(sj =0 ,s i =1 ,a). Hence, the right hand side of equation (6.5) is strictly
larger than the ﬁrst three terms on the left hand side, which immediately leads to a contradiction.
(d) Start from cj(sj =1 ,s i,a) ≥ cj(sj =0 ,s i,a),∀a. Then (2.12) implies that ci(sj =1 ,s i,a) ≥
ci(sj =0 ,s i,a). The result follows immediately from equations (2.13) and (2.14).
(e) By contradiction: suppose there is an a ∈ [a,a] such that a (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a) >aand
Ui
c(ci(sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a),·)=β(1 + r)E

Ui
c(ci(s ,a  (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a)),·)

,i = f,m.
(The equality follows from a (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a) >a≥ a.) Since (i) β(1 + r) ≤ 1, (ii) ci(s,a)













Combining these two expressions implies that
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Using part (c) this can only hold if ci(s,a) is the same for all s ∈ S × S and, consequently,
a (s,a) >afor all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this implies that future





c(ci(s ,a  (s,a)),·)

.





c(ci(s ,a  (s,a)),·)

,
which is impossible for β(1 + r) ≤ 1.
Strict inequality: suppose there is an a ∈ (a,a) such that a (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a)=a. Using part (c)
it follows that a (s,a) ≥ a for all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this implies that
future consumption will be at least as high as current consumption in any state s  and, hence,
Ui
c(ci(sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a),·) ≥ E

Ui
c(ci(s ,a  (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,,a)),·)

.
The Euler equation, however, requires
Ui
c(ci(sf =0 ,s m =,a),·)=β(1 + r)E

Ui
c(ci(s ,a  (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a)),·)

,
(the equality follows from a (sf =0 ,s m =0 ,a)=a>a ). This is impossible for β(1 + r) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In order to compact notation, we will write ˜ a(μ) simply as ˜ a.
(a) Let us ﬁrst assume r>0. We prove that a (s, a) ≤  a. The result then follows from the fact
that a (s,a) is increasing in a, as shown before. From part (c) of Proposition 1, a (sf =0 ,s m =
0, a) ≤  a. Then using the budget constraint:
a (sf =0 ,s m =0 , a) ≤  a (6.6)
wf ·





1 − lm(sf =0 ,s m =0 , a)

· 0
+(1 + r) a − cf(sf =0 ,s m =0 , a) − cm(sf =0 ,s m =0 , a) ≤  a (6.7)
cf(sf =0 ,s m =0 , a)+cm(sf =0 ,s m =0 , a) ≥ r a. (6.8)
From before we know that decision rules for consumption are increasing in endowments; hence,
cf(s, a)+cm(s, a) ≥ r a, ∀s.
Finally, use the deﬁnition of  a from above and the FOC with respect to leisure to get
lf(s, a)=lm(s, a)=1, ∀s.
Hence, a (s, a) ≤  a.
Case r ≤ 0: Take a1 <a 2 and thus cf(s,a 1)+cm(s,a 1) <c f(s,a 2)+cm(s,a 2). Plug in the budget
constraints:
wf(1 − lf(s,a 1))sf + wm(1 − lm(s,a 1))sm +( 1+r)a1 − a (s,a 1) <
wf(1 − lf(s,a 2))sf + wm(1 − lm(s,a 2))sm +( 1+r)a2 − a (s,a 2) (6.9)
33and thus
a (s,a 2) − a (s,a 1) < (1 + r)(a2 − a1)+wf(lf(s,a 1) − lf(s,a 2))sf + wm(lm(s,a 1) − lf(s,a 2))sm.
Divide by a2 − a1:






wf(lf(s,a 1)−lf(s,a 2))sf +wm(lm(s,a 1)−lf(s,a 2))sm

.
Since leisure is increasing in a, the last two terms are non-positive. Also, r is non-positive by
assumption. Therefore,
a (s,a 2) − a (s,a 1)
a2 − a1
< 1.
That is, the decision rule for capital accumulation has a slope that is strictly lower than 1 and
strictly positive. This implies that for all s there is a level of asset holdings  a(s) (this is not the
same  a as above!) such that a (s, a) ≤  a, i.e. a  crosses the 45 degree line at most once.
(b) Take an arbitrary level of asset holdings a0 ≥  a and check whether the proposed allocation 
 cf, cm, lf, lm, a 

satisﬁes ﬁrst-order optimality:
• equation (2.12) is satisﬁed by deﬁnition
•  cf +  cm = ar≥  ar=  cf +  cm; moreover,  ci ≥  ci =⇒  Ui
c ≤  Ui
c, i = f,m, which implies by
(2.20) that equations (2.13) and (2.14) are satisﬁed
• the budget constraint (2.10) holds and
• the Euler equation (2.16) holds because consumption is constant.
Since the problem is concave, ﬁrst-order optimality is suﬃcient for an optimum. Since the policy
functions characterize the optimum, the proposed allocation is optimal.
(c) The proof exploits results in Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), which are also used in Marcet,Obiols-
Homs and Weil (2007). Part (a) implies that at ≤  a(μ), ∀t, and part (b) of Proposition 1 together
with part (b) of Proposition 2 imply that ci
t ≤  ci(μ),i= f,m, so that individual consumption
levels are bounded almost surely. The ﬁrst-order condition to savings (2.16) and (2.17) imply
that Ui
c,t ≥ Et(Ui
c,t+1) almost surely, so that Ui
c,t is a super-martingale. As Ui
c,t is bounded





, we can apply the martingale convergence theorem, which implies that
Ui
c,t converges almost surely to a random variable. Suppose, by contradiction, that Ui
c,t con-





, which would imply that consumption levels
would converge to values  ci <  ci(μ), so that the consumption-leisure choice would be interior for
at least one of the two spouses when employed. In that case labor income would converge to
ι ≡ wf(1− lf)sf +wm(1− lm)sm, where  lf and/or  lm are strictly smaller than 1 and solve (2.13)
34and (2.14). ι is a non-degenerate random variable with positive variance, which implies that the
lower or upper bounds on asset holdings would be violated with positive probability, a contra-
diction. This follows from the result of Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) that under β(1 + r)=1
consumption and asset grow with no bound if income is suitably stochastic. Thus, Ui
c,t cannot












is invertible, consumption will converge to  ci(μ). The budget constraint implies that at must
converge to  a(μ).
Appendix II: The Complete Markets Economy
Let θ(s) denote the number of Arrow securities owned by the collective household. Then the


















cf + cm +

s 
p(s,s )θ (s )=

i=f,m
wi(1 − li)si +

i=f,m
wi(1 − si)bi + θ(s) (6.11)
cf,c m ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lf,l m ≤ 1. (6.12)
where p(s,s ) denotes the price of an Arrow security that is purchased by a household in state s
and pays one unit of the consumption good in the subsequent period if state s  is realized. For a
household with relative Pareto weight μ in state s, solving (6.10) yields the following system of
optimality conditions:
μUf



















c ∀s  ∈ S × S. (6.16)
Imposing the no-arbitrage condition, 1 + r =
πs |s
p(s,s ), one can rewrite the Euler equation as,
35Uf
c = β(1 + r)Uf 
c ∀s  ∈ S × S. (6.17)
For a steady-state equilibrium to exist we will require β(1 + r) = 1, and the previous expression
simpliﬁes to
Uf
c = Uf 
c ∀s  ∈ S × S. (6.18)
That is, households choose θ(s ) such that the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across
diﬀerent states and diﬀerent points in time. In the special case when utility is separable between
consumption and leisure, consumption levels are independent of the individual state and constant
over time.
Deﬁnition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with complete markets in the econ-
omy with collective households is a list of functions
	
V,cf,c m,l f,l m,θ,K,L f,L m

, a measure of
households ψ, a set of prices
	










, and a pricing
function p(s,s ) such that:
















are the associated optimal
policy functions.
(2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions:
(i) r = FK(K,L) − δ
(ii) wf =( 1− λ)FL(K,L)
(iii) wm = λFL(K,L).





























(3) The pricing function p(s,s ) satisﬁes a no-arbitrage condition: 1 + r =
πs |s
p(s,s ).
(4) The steady-state condition β(1 + r) = 1 holds.
(5) The government budget is balanced: q
f
0bf + qm
0 bm = τf ¯ wfLf + τm ¯ wmLm.
36Appendix III: Frisch Elasticities of Labor Supply








1 (1 − τm)¯ wm + qm
0 bm, (6.19)
is a function of female and male wages, Frisch elasticities of labor supply depend both on the
Pareto weight and its derivative with respect to wages. In this Appendix we derive the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply for females and males. For convenience, we write again the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to leisure at an interior solution. If we use Λ to denote the marginal utility
of wealth, these ﬁrst-order conditions are
μ(x,z)U
f
l =Λ wf (6.20)
(1 − μ(x,z))Um
l =Λ wm. (6.21)
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, say ηi, of an agent of gender i = f,m captures how her/his
labor supply responds to an intertemporal reallocation of wages that leaves the marginal utility












For females, the Frisch elasticity can be readily obtained after diﬀerentiating equation (6.20) with













dwf =Λ , (6.23)
where μ1 denotes the derivative of μ with respect to it ﬁrst argument, x. After plugging the value


























1 wm + qm
0 bmUm
l +( 1− μ)Um
ll
dlm
dwm =Λ . (6.25)
After rearranging terms, plugging in the value of Λ from the ﬁrst-order condition and multiplying

















37Appendix IV: Household Risk Aversion with Risk Sharing
In this appendix we derive the coeﬃcient of risk aversion of the two-person collective household
as a function of individual preferences for risk and the relative Pareto weight. We also show that
the derivative of the risk-sharing rule for a household member of gender i = f,m, is given by
the product of the household’s coeﬃcient of risk aversion and the individual’s coeﬃcient of risk
tolerance.
The coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of a bachelor household with instantaneous utility function






, for i = f,m.
For the utility function assumed in (3.5), this coeﬃcient is σi/c.
When two individuals with diﬀerent attitudes towards risk form a household and share risks,
the household’s coeﬃcient of risk aversion is obviously diﬀerent from individual ones. Collective
household’s risk preferences will depend on individual preferences and Pareto weights.
Collective Household’s Risk Aversion
Let us denote the utility function of the two-person, collective household over total household
consumption, y, and individual leisures, lf and lm,b yu(y,lf,l m;μ). This utility function is
deﬁned as,
uμ(y,lf,l m) = max
cf,cm{μUf(cf,l f)+ ( 1 − μ)Um(cm,l m)} (6.27)
s.t. = cf + cm = y. (6.28)
With this utility function we can write the maximization problem solved by the collective house-
hold as,






˜ V (s,a  ;μ)} (6.29)
s.t. ˜ c + a  =

i=f,m
wi(1 − li)si +

i=f,m
(1 − si)bi +( 1+r)a. (6.30)
(6.31)






To derive this coeﬃcient of risk aversion let us consider the ﬁrst-order condition to the static
maximization problem embedded into the household problem,
38μϕf
c(cf)−σf
=( 1 − μ)ϕm
c (cm)−σm
. (6.32)
































Then, the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of a household with Pareto weight μ is,
ρμ =
σfσm
σmcf + σfcm, (6.37)
and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is
σfσm(cf+cm)
σmcf+σfcm .
Now, it is straightforward to show that the derivatives of the sharing rules, dcf
dy and dcm
dy , are given
by the household’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, ρμ, times the coeﬃcient of absolute risk










where the expression within brackets on the right-hand side is the household’s coeﬃcient of ab-
solute risk aversion and the second term, cf/σf, is the individual’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk
tolerance. The same result can be shown for dcm
dy .
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Figure 4: Excess savings of household without risk sharing